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THE MODAL LOGIC OF σ-CENTERED FORCING AND RELATED FORCING
CLASSES
UR BEN-ARI-TISHLER
Abstract. We consider the modality “ϕ is true in every σ-centered forcing extension”,
denoted ϕ, and its dual “ϕ is true in some σ-centered forcing extension”, denoted ♦ϕ
(where ϕ is a statement in set theory), which give rise to the notion of a principle of σ-
centered forcing. We prove that if ZFC is consistent, then the modal logic of σ-centered
forcing, i.e. the ZFC-provable principles of σ-centered forcing, is exactly S4.2. We also
generalize this result to other related classes of forcing.
1. Introduction
Modal logic is used to formalize various modalities appearing in language, the most
common of which are the notions of possibility and necessity (alethic modalities), but
also temporal modalities such as “always”, doxastic modalities such as “believes” and
many more. Given a certain formal language for modal logic, one can adjoin an intended
interpretation to the modal operators, and with this intended interpretation in mind,
find the right modal theory to fit one’s needs. Besides these meta-theoretical semantics,
modal logic has a few formal semantics, the most prominent of which is the “possible
worlds semantics”, or Kripke semantics, which give formal meaning to the intuition that
something is possible if “it is true in some possible alternative world”, and necessary if “it
is true in all possible worlds”. These semantics are based on the so-called Kripke models,
which consist of a set of “worlds”, related by an “accessibility relation” where a statement
is possible in some world if there is a world accessible to it where the statement is true;
and similarly, a statement is necessary if it is true in all accessible worlds. These seman-
tics are highly reminiscent of the situation in set-theoretic forcing, where we have models
of set-theory, related to one another by the relation of “being a forcing extension”. This
suggest a forcing interpretation of modal logic, where a statement is said to be possible,
or forceable, if it is true in some forcing extension (of the universe), and necessary if it is
true in all forcing extensions. This interpretation was first suggested by Joel Hamkins in
[4], where he used it to formalize a new forcing axiom called the “Maximality Principle”
(MP). With this interpretation in place, the question arose - what modal theory best
captures this interpretation? In other words - what is the “Modal Logic of Forcing”? This
question actually splits into two - first, what modal principles of forcing are provable in
ZFC? And second, given a specific model of ZFC, what are the modal principles true in
it? These questions were formally asked by Hamkins and Benedikt Löwe in [6], where
they answered the first question by showing that the ZFC-provable principles of forcing
are exactly the modal theory known as S4.2 (see below). They also began addressing the
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second question, by showing, e.g., that the modal principles true in any specific model
contain S4.2 and are contained in S5, and that both ends of the spectrum are realized
(by L on one hand and by Hamkins’s model for the Maximality Principle on the other).
Another related question is - what happens if we consider only a specific class of forc-
ing notions, such as the class of all c.c.c forcings? This question was addressed more
extensively in [5], where it was shown, e.g., that the ZFC-provable principles of collapse
forcing are exactly S4.3. In this work we continue this line of inquiry, with respect to
the class of all σ-centered forcing notions. Thus, the main result of this work is that the
modal logic of σ-centered forcing is exactly the modal theory S4.2. After establishing
this main theorem, we show that the techniques developed here can be adjusted to other
related classes of forcing notions.
We begin by setting some preliminaries - first we cite common definitions and theo-
rems of forcing and of modal logic; and then present the main tools developed in [6, 5]
for the research of the modal logic of forcing; we add one new notion to this set of tools,
the notion of an n-switch, and show it’s utility. Then we present the class of σ-centered
forcing, prove some of its properties which give us the easy part of the theorem - that
the modal logic of σ-centered forcing contains S4.2, and present the technique of coding
subsets using σ-centered forcing. The hard part of the main theorem will be proved in
section 4, where we begin by defining a specific model of ZFC, and then present two
forcing constructions that would allow us to establish that the modal logic of σ-centered
forcing is contained in S4.2. We conclude with the above-mentioned generalizations and
some open questions.
2. Preliminaries
We begin by presenting some notations and background that will be used in this work.
2.1. Forcing. Our forcing notation will usually follow Kunen’s [10, chapterVII]. A poset
P = (P,≤) will usually be confused with it’s underlying set. We say that p is stronger
than q, or p extends q, if p ≤ q. Unless stated otherwise, every poset is assumed to
have a unique maximal element, denoted 1P or just 1 if the context is clear. We denote
compatible elements by p ‖ q and incompatible by p⊥q. We usually denote P-names by
letters τ, σ etc., or with a dot - x˙. The canonical names for elements of the ground model
are denoted by “check” - xˇ. For a model M , we will sometimes denote by MP just any
generic extension ofM by a P-generic filter.
In this work, Cohen forcing C is the poset ω<ω, where s ≤ t iff t is an initial segment
of s (denoted t E s). We denote the length of s ∈ ω<ω by ℓ (s). If G ⊆ C is a generic
filter, then f =
⋃
G is in ωω and is called a Cohen generic real. Any real r ∈ ωω is called
Cohen generic if there is some generic H ⊆ C such that r =
⋃
H . This means that r is
generic if every dense open set in ω<ω meets some finite initial segment of r.
We can extend the notion of “dense-open set” to ωω:
Definition 2.1. (1) A basic open set (in ωω) is a set of the formUs :={x ∈ ω
ω |sE x}
for some s ∈ ω<ω;
(2) A set U ⊆ ωω is open if for every x ∈ U there is some s ∈ ω<ω such that
x ∈ Us ⊆ U ;
(3) A set D ⊆ ωω is dense if it meets every basic-open set.
A real r is Cohen generic over a model M if it is in any open dense subset of ωω in
M .
THE MODAL LOGIC OF σ-CENTERED FORCING AND RELATED FORCING CLASSES 3
2.2. Modal logic. We provide a short account of modal logic based on [2]. The reader
who is familiar with modal logic may wish to skip to definition 2.2. We work with
propositional modal logic, in which formulas are constructed from propositional vari-
ables p, q, r . . . or p0, p1, . . . ; the logical connectives - ∧, ∨, ¬, →, ↔; and two unary
operators - ,♦. For a formula ϕ, ϕ is read “box ϕ” or “necessarily ϕ” and ♦ϕ is read
“diamond ϕ” or "possibly ϕ". Unlike classical propositional logic, in modal logic there are
many possible axiomatic systems resulting in different modal theories. Amodal theory is
a set of modal formulas containing all classical tautologies and closed under the deduc-
tion rules modus pones (from ϕ and ϕ→ ψ deduce ψ) and necessitation (from ϕ, deduce
ϕ), and under uniform substitution. We will focus on the modal theory S4.2 obtained
from the following axioms:
K  (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
Dual ♦ϕ↔ ¬¬ϕ
T ϕ→ ϕ
4 ϕ→ ϕ
.2 ♦ϕ→ ♦ϕ
by closing under the deduction rules.
Our semantics for modal logic are based on the notion ot a Kripke model - a triplet
M = 〈W,R, V 〉 where W is a non-empty set, R is a binary relation on W and V a
function from the propositional variables to subsets of W . Elements of W are usually
called worlds, and R is called the accessibility relation. Thus wRu is referred to as “u is
accessible to w”. F = 〈W,R〉 is called the frame on whichM is based. V , the valuation,
assigns every propositional variable p a set of worlds V (p) ⊆W , which are considered as
the worlds where p is true. To make this notion precise, we define the relationM, w  ϕ
(“ϕ is satisfied in w”), where w ∈ W , by induction on the construction of the formula,
where the atomic case is given by V , the logical connectives are defined in the obvious
way, and for the modal operators we use:
• M, w  ϕ iff for every u ∈W such that wRu,M, u  ϕ;
• M, w  ♦ϕ iff there exists u ∈W such that wRu andM, u  ϕ.
We say that ϕ is valid in M, M  ϕ, ifM, w  ϕ for every w ∈ W , and that that ϕ is
valid on a frame F , F  ϕ, if ϕ is valid in every model based on F .
So far, no assumptions on the accessibility relation were made. And in fact, there is a
strong connection between properties of the relation and the valid formulas of the model.
Let Λ be a modal theory, and C some class of frames. We say Λ is sound with respect to
C if every ϕ ∈ Λ is valid in every frame in C. Λ is complete with respect to C if every
formula valid in every frame of C is in Λ; equivalently, for every ϕ /∈ Λ there is some
modelM = 〈W,R, V 〉 where 〈W,R〉 ∈ C and some w ∈ W such thatM, w  ¬ϕ. Λ is
characterized by C if it is sound and complete with respect to it.
A well known theorem is that the modal theory we are interested in, S4.2, is char-
acterized by the class of finite frames 〈W,R〉 for which R is reflexive, transitive and
directed (i.e. wRv ∧ wRu → ∃z(vRz ∧ uRz)). However, it will be convenient to find a
class of more structured frames characterizing this theory.
Definition 2.2. Let 〈F,≤〉 such that ≤ is a reflexive and transitive binary relation on
F . We can define an equivalence relation on F by setting x ≡ y iff x ≤ y ≤ x. This
equivalence relation induces a partial order on F/ ≡, which we will also denote by ≤.
〈F,≤〉 is called a pre-Boolean-algebra (a pBA) if 〈F/≡,≤〉 is a Boolean-algebra (a BA).
Note that a pBA is in particular reflexive, transitive and directed.
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A pBA can be thought of as a BA where every element is replaced by a cluster of
equivalent elements.
Theorem 2.3 (Theorem 11 in [6]). S4.2 is characterized by the class of all finite pre-
Boolean-algebras.
2.3. The modal logic of forcing. We present the framework of the modal logic of
forcing, based on [6] and [5]. The reader who is familiar with these works may wish to
skip to definition 2.12 where we define the new notion of an n-switch.
As we mentioned in the introduction, the possible world semantics suggest a con-
nection between modal logic and forcing, as we can imagine all generic extensions of
the universe (or of a specific model of ZFC) as an enormous Kripke model (called “the
generic multiverse”). This leads to the forcing interpretation of modal logic, in which we
say that a sentence of set-theory ϕ is necessary (ϕ) if it is true in all forcing extensions,
and possible (♦ϕ) if it is true in some forcing extension. Note that these operators can
be expressed in the language of set-theory by the definability of the forcing relation: ϕ
is the statement “for every poset P and p ∈ P, p  ϕ” and ♦ϕ is the statement “there is
a poset P and p ∈ P such that p  ϕ”. Given some definable class of forcing notions Γ,
we can also restrict to posets belonging to that class, to get the operators Γ,♦Γ. The
following definitions, based on [6] and [5], allow us to formally ask the question - what
statements are valid under this interpretation?
Definition 2.4. (1) Given a formula ϕ = ϕ (q0,..., qn) in the language of modal
logic, where q0,..., qn are the only propositional variable appearing in ϕ, and
some set-theoretic sentences ψ0,..., ψn, the substitution instance ϕ (ψ0,..., ψn)
is the set-theoretic statement obtained recursively by replacing qi with ψi and
interpreting the modal operators according to the forcing interpretation (or the
Γ-forcing interpretation).
(2) Let Γ be a class of forcing notions. The ZFC-provable principles of Γ-forcing are
all the modal formulas ϕ such that ZFC ⊢ ϕ (ψ0,..., ψn) for every substitution
qi 7→ ψi under the Γ-forcing interpretation. This will also be called the modal
logic of Γ-forcing, denoted MLF (Γ). If we discuss the class of all forcing notions
we omit mention of Γ.
Theorem 2.5 (Hamkins and Löwe, [6]). If ZFC is consistent then the ZFC-provable
principles of forcing are exactly S4.2.
We will now present the main tools which were developed to prove the theorem
above, and which can be used to prove similar theorems. To prove such a theorem,
we need to establish lower and upper bounds, i.e. find a modal theory Λ such that
MLF (Γ) ⊇ Λ and MLF (Γ) ⊆ Λ respectively. Each type of bound require a different
set of tools, which will be presented below.
2.3.1. Lower bounds. A simple observation is that the ZFC-provable principles of Γ-
forcing are closed under the deduction rules - modus ponens is obvious, but also ne-
cessitation, since if every substitution instance of ϕ is provable, it is true in every model,
and in particular in every generic extension, so also every substitution ofϕ is provable.
So if a modal theory is given by some axioms, to show it is contained in MLF (Γ) it is
enough to check that the axioms are valid principles of Γ-forcing. So for example, axioms
K and Dual are easily seen to be valid under the Γ-forcing interpretation for every class
Γ. The validity of other axioms depends on specific properties of Γ.
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Definition 2.6. A definable class of forcing notions Γ is said to be reflexive if it contains
the trivial forcing; transitive if it is closed under finite iterations, i.e. if P ∈ Γ and Q˙ is a
P-name for a poset such that P Q˙ ∈ Γ, then P ∗ Q˙ ∈ Γ; persistent if P,Q ∈ Γ implies
Q ∈ ΓV
P
; and directed if P,Q ∈ Γ implies that there is someR ∈ Γ such thatR is forcing
equivalent to P ∗ S˙ and to Q ∗ T˙, where S˙ ∈ ΓV
P
and T˙ ∈ ΓV
Q
.
Note that if a Γ is transitive and persistent, we can show it is directed by taking
R = P×Q for any P,Q ∈ Γ.
Example 2.7. The class of all forcing notions is reflexive, transitive and persistent (and
thus directed). The class of all c.c.c forcing notions is reflexive and transitive, but not
persistent, and in fact not directed.
Theorem 2.8 (Thm. 7 in [5]). Axiom T is valid in every reflexive forcing class, axiom 4
in every transitive forcing class and axiom .2 in every directed forcing class. Thus, if Γ is
reflexive, transitive and directed then MLF(Γ) ⊇ S4.2.
2.3.2. Upper bounds. To establish thatΛ is an upper bound forMLF (Γ), we need to show
that every formula not in Λ is also not in MLF (Γ). To do so, we would need to find a
model of ZFC and some substitution instance of ϕ that fails in this model. In the case
that Λ is complete w.r.t some class of frames C, ϕ /∈ Λ means that there is some Kripke
model based on a frame in C where ϕ fails. So our goal would be to find a suitable model
of set theory W such that the Γ-generic multiverse generated by W (i.e. all Γ-forcing
extensions of W ) “looks like” the model where ϕ fails. The main tool for that is called a
labeling:
Definition 2.9. A Γ-labeling of a frame 〈F,R〉 for a model of set-theory W is an assign-
ment to each w ∈ F a set-theoretic statement Φw such that:
(1) The statements form a mutually exclusive partition of truth in the Γ-generic mul-
tiverse overW , i.e. every Γ-generic extension ofW satisfies exactly one Φw .
(2) The statements correspond to the relation, i.e. if W [G] is a Γ-forcing extension
ofW that satisfies Φw , thenW [G]  ♦Φu iff wRu.
(3) W  Φw0 where w0 is a given initial element of F .
Lemma 2.10 (The labeling lemma - Lemma 9 in [5]). Suppose w 7→ Φw is a Γ-labeling
of a finite frame 〈F,R〉 for a model of set-theory W with w0 an initial world of F , and
M a Kripke model based on F . Then there is an assignment of the propositional variables
p 7→ ψp such that for every modal formula ϕ (p0,..., pn)
M, w0  ϕ (p0,..., pn) iff W  ϕ (ψp0 ,..., ψpn) .
Corollary 2.11. If every finite pre-Boolean-algebra has a Γ-labeling over some model of
ZFC, then MLF (Γ) ⊆ S4.2
Proof. By theorem 2.3, every modal formula ϕ /∈ S4.2 fails in a Kripke model based on
some finite pBA. So, given a Γ-labeling for this frame over a model W , by the label-
ing lemma there is a substitution instance of ϕ which fails at W under the Γ-forcing
interpretation. So ϕ /∈ MLF (Γ). 
Hence to establish upper bounds, we try to find labelings for specific frames. Various
labelings can be constructed using certain kinds of set-theoretic statements, called in
general control statements.
Definition 2.12 (Control statements). Let W be some model of set theory, and Γ some
class of forcing notions.
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(1) A switch for Γ-forcing over W is a statement s such that necessarily, both s and
¬s are possible. That is, over every extension ofW one can force s or ¬s as one
chooses.
(2) An n-switch for Γ-forcing overW is a set of statements {si | i < n} (where n > 1)
such that every Γ-generic extension W ′ of W satisfies exactly one si, and if
W ′  si and j 6= i then there is a Γ-forcing extension of W
′ satisfying sj . The
n-switch value in someW [G] is the i such thatW [G]  si. Note that a 2-switch
is just a switch.
(3) A button for Γ-forcing over W is a statement b which is necessarily possibly nec-
essary, i.e. W  ♦b. This means that in every extension of W , we can force
b to be true and to remain true in every further extension. A button is called
pushed if b holds, otherwise it is called unpushed. A pure button is a button b
such that  (b→ b) (i.e. if it is true then it is pushed). If b is an unpushed
button then b is an unpushed pure button.
(4) A ratchet for Γ-forcing overW is a collection of pure buttons {ri | i ∈ I}, possibly
with i as a parameter, where I is well-ordered, such that pushing ri pushes every
rj for j < i, and necessarily, every unpushed ri can be pushed without pushing
any rj for j > i. An infinite ratchet {ri | i ∈ I} is called strong if there is no Γ-
extension of W satisfying every ri. The ratchet value in W [G] is the first i ∈ I
such thatW [G]  ¬ri.
(5) A family of control statements (switches, n-switches, buttons, ratchets) is called
independent over W (for Γ-forcing) if in W , all buttons are unpushed (including
the ones in any ratchet), and necessarily, using Γ-forcing, each button can be
pushed, each switch can be turned on or off, the value of each n-switch can be
changed, and the value of every ratchet can be increased, without affecting any
other control statement in the family.
Note the “necessarily” - the independence needs to be preserved in any Γ-
forcing extension ofW .
n-switches are less naturally occurring in set-theory than the other notions, and in-
deed they were not explicitly defined in [6] and [5]. However, by examining the proofs
of some of the main theorems there, one can see that what was implicitly used was an
n-switch, which was constructed using switches (cf. [5, theorems 10,11,13]). Addition-
ally, in some cases switches were constructed from ratchets and then transformed into
n-switches (e.g. in [5, theorems 12, 15]). So, in the definition of some of the central
labelings, n-switches turn out to be the more natural notion, and we will show how to
construct them using either switches or a ratchet independently. Hence the following
theorem, which gives sufficient conditions for the existence of labelings for finite pBA’s,
generalizes some of the above-mentioned theorems from [5], and they can be inferred
from it. We will not be able to use the theorem as it is to prove our main theorem, but
we will use it’s proof as a model, so it has instructive value in itself.
Theorem 2.13. Let Γ be some reflexive and transitive forcing class and W a model of set
theory. If there are arbitrarily large finite families of buttons, mutually independent of n-
switches for large enough n’s, then there is a Γ-labeling over W for every frame which is a
finite pre-Boolean-algebra .
Proof. Let 〈F,≤〉 be a finite pBA. As noted earlier, it can be viewed a finite BA, where
each element is replaced by a cluster of equivalent worlds. We can add dummy worlds
to each cluster without changing satisfaction in the model, so we can assume that each
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cluster is of size n for some 1 < n < ω. It is known that any finite BA is isomorphic to
the BA 〈P (B) ,⊆〉 for some finite set B. Let B be such that 〈F/ ≡,≤〉 ∼= 〈P (B) ,⊆〉,
and set m = |B|. We can assume that in fact B = {0,...,m− 1}. There is a correspon-
dence between subsets A ⊆ B and clusters in 〈F,≤〉. Each cluster is of size n, so by
enumerating each cluster, all the elements of F can be named wAi for i < n and A ⊆ B,
where wAi ≤ w
A′
j iff A ⊆ A
′. An initial world in F must be in the bottom cluster, which
corresponds to ∅ ⊆ B so WLoG it is enumerated as w∅0 .
By the assumption, adding more dummy worlds to each cluster if needed, there are
buttons {b0,..., bm−1} and an n-switch {s0,..., sn−1} all independent of each other over
W . We can assume the buttons are pure. To define a labeling, each cluster, corresponding
to some A ⊆ B, will be labeled by the statement that the only buttons pushed are
the ones with indexes from A. Inside each cluster, each world will be labeled by the
corresponding value of the n-switch. Formally, we set
Φ
(
wAi
)
=
∧
j∈A
bj ∧
∧
j /∈A
¬bj ∧ si
and claim that this is a labeling as required by verifying the conditions:
(1) If W [G] is a Γ-generic extension of W , define A = {j < m |W [G]  bj}. By
the definition of the n-switch, W [G]  si for some unique i < n. So it is clear
thatW [G]  Φ
(
wAi
)
, and that for any other pair (A′, i′) 6= (A, i) with A′ ⊆ B,
and i′ < n, W [G] 2 Φ
(
wA
′
i′
)
. So these statements indeed form a mutually
exclusive partition of truth in the Γ-generic multiverse overW .
(2) AssumeW [G] is a Γ-generic extension ofW such thatW [G]  Φ
(
wAi
)
.
If wAi ≤ u, then as we have seen, u = w
A′
i′ for some i
′ < n and A ⊆ A′ ⊆ B.
By the assumption of independence of the control statements, we can, by Γ-
forcing, push all the buttons in A′rA (and only them) and change the n-switch
value to i′ (if needed), to obtain an extension ofW [G] satisfying Φ
(
wA
′
i′
)
. Note
that by the transitivity of Γ, the bi’s are still independent pure buttons inW [G],
since every Γ-extension of W [G] is also a Γ-extension of W . In particular, any
button true in W [G] remains true in the extension. So W [G]  ♦Φ
(
wA
′
i′
)
as
required.
If W [G]  ♦Φ
(
wA
′
i′
)
, then there is some extension W [G] [H ]  Φ
(
wA
′
i′
)
.
By the definition of pure buttons and the reflexivity of Γ, W [G] 
∧
j∈A bj
impliesW [G] 
∧
j∈Abj , soW [G] [H ] 
∧
j∈A bj . Therefore by the definition
of Φ
(
wA
′
i′
)
, we must have A ⊆ A′, so wAi ≤ w
A′
i′ .
(3) A part of the definition of independence is that no button is pushed inW (since
they are pure and Γ reflexive, it is equivalent to saying none is true). We can
assume WLoG thatW  s0. SoW  Φ
(
w∅0
)
. 
Corollary 2.14. Under the assumptions of theorem 2.13, MLF (Γ) ⊆ S4.2.
Proof. Apply corollary 2.11. 
Lemma 2.15. An n-switch can be produced using the following control statements:
(1) Independent switches s0,..., sm−1 if n = 2
m;
(2) A strong ratchet {ri | i ∈ I} where I is either a limit ordinal or Ord, the class of
all ordinals, and i ∈ I is a parameter in ri.
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Proof. For (1), if j < 2m let s¯j be the statement that the pattern of switches corresponds
to the binary digits of j, that is,∧
{si | the i-th binary digit of j is 1} ∧
∧
{¬si | the i-th binary digit of j is 0} .
Clearly in any extension exactly one pattern of the switches holds, so exactly one s¯j
holds. By the independence of the switches, any pattern can be forced over any exten-
sion.
For (2), every i ∈ I is an ordinal, so of the form ω · α + k for some α ∈ Ord and
k < ω. Then we let s¯j be the statement “if i = ω · α + k is the first such that ¬ri then
k mod n = j”. Since no extension satisfies all the ri’s, there is always some i which is
the first such that ¬ri, and therefore there is some unique j such that s¯j holds. Since
it is a ratchet, in every extension, for every j′ < n, we can increase its value to some
i′ = ω · α′ + k′ for some k′ > k such that k′ mod n = j (we use the assumption that if
I is an ordinal then it is a limit). 
Note also that every family of independent buttons 〈bi | i ∈ I〉 where I is as above,
with no extensions where all of them are pushed, can be transformed into a strong ratchet
by setting ri = ∀j < i bj ∧ ¬bi. To conclude, we get the following:
Corollary 2.16 ([5, theorems 13 and 15]1). Let Γ be some reflexive and transitive forcing
class and W a model of set theory. If there are arbitrarily large finite families of buttons
mutually independent with arbitrarily large finite families of switches, with a strong ratchet
as above or with another family of independent buttons as above, then there is a Γ-labeling
for every frame which is a finite pre-Boolean-algebra over W . So in such cases, MLF (Γ) ⊆
S4.2.
3. σ-centered forcing
We now proceed to the investigation of the modal logic of a specific class of forcing
notions - the class of all σ-centered forcing notions.
Definition 3.1. Let P be any poset.
(1) A subset C ⊆ P is called centered if any finite number of elements in C have a
common extension in P.
(2) A poset is called σ-centered if it is the union of countably many centered subsets.
Remark 3.2. For convenience we will always assume that the top element 1P is in each of
the centered posets. This does not affect the generality since every element is compatible
with it. It will also sometimes be convenient to assume that if P =
⋃
n∈ω Pn where each
Pn is centered, then each Pn is upward closed, i.e. if q ∈ Pn and q ≤ p then p ∈ Pn.
This also doesn’t affect the generality since if q1,..., qk ∈ Pn and qi ≤ pi then a common
extension for the qi’s will also extend the pi’s .
The following is a central example for a σ-centered forcing, versions of which will be
used later on:
Definition 3.3. Let Y be a subset of P (ω). We define a poset PY as follows:
• The elements are of the form 〈s, t〉 where s is a finite subset of ω and t a finite
subset of Y ;
• 〈s, t〉 is extended by 〈s′, t′〉 if s ⊆ s′, t ⊆ t′ and for every A ∈ t, s ∩ A = s′ ∩ A.
1In [5, theorem 15] they have a slightly different convention, where the ratchet value is the last button which
is pushed, and they use the notion of a uniform ratchet, but the theorem is essentially the same.
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So we think of the first component as finite approximations for a generic real x ⊆
ω, while the second component limits our options in extending the approximation. A
condition p = 〈s, t〉 tells us that s ⊆ x and that for every A ∈ t, x ∩ A = s ∩ A, so that
the intersection of x with any set in Y will turn out to be finite.
Lemma 3.4. For any Y ⊆ P (ω), PY is σ-centered.
Proof. Note that if t1,..., tn are finite subsets of Y , then for any s ∈ [ω]
<ω
, the conditions
〈s, t1〉 ,..., 〈s, tn〉 are all extended by 〈s, t1 ∪ · · · ∪ tn〉. So P is the union of the centered
posets Ps = {〈s, t〉 | t ⊆ Y finite}. Since there are only countably many finite subsets of
ω, we get that P is σ-centered. 
We will explore the properties of this kind of posets in section 3.2.
3.1. Properties of σ-centered forcing. We proceed with a few general properties of
forcing with σ-centered posets. Most of them are folklore, but we provide the proofs for
the benefit of the reader. An immediate observation is that every σ-centered poset also
has the c.c.c, since any uncountable set will have an uncountable intersection with one of
the centered posets, and therefore cannot be an antichain. So forcing with a σ-centered
posets preserves all cardinals and cofinalities.
But σ-centered forcing notions have the stronger property that they also preserve the
continuum function:
Lemma 3.5. Assume λ ≥ ℵ0, 2
λ = κ and let P be some σ-centered forcing notion. Then
V P  2λ = κ.2
Proof. Assume P =
⋃
n<ω Pn where each Pn is centered. Let f ∈ V
P be some function
from λ to 2 , let f˙ be a name denoting f and q ∈ P s.t. q  f˙ : λˇ→ 2ˇ. In V , define
Af =
{
(α, n, i) | α < λ, i < 2, ∃p ∈ Pn
(
p ≤ q ∧ p  f˙ (αˇ) = iˇ
)}
.
So, if f, g : λ→ 2 are distinct, then Af 6= Ag . To see this, say f (α) = 0 and g (α) = 1,
and let p force both these facts. So, if p ∈ Pn, we clearly get that (α, n, 0) ∈ Af . But also
(α, n, 0) /∈ Ag , since that would imply there is some p
′ ∈ Pn such that p′  g˙ (αˇ) = 0,
but p is compatible with p′ and p  g˙ (αˇ) = 1 by contradiction. Hence 2λ in V P is
bounded by the possible number of sets of the form Af in V , which is bounded by
|{(α, n, i) | α < λ, n < ω, i < 2}| ≤
∣∣λ×ω2∣∣ = 2λ = κ
so V P  2λ ≤ κ (note that as we mentioned earlier, by c.c.c κV = κV
P
). Since every
subset of λ in V is also one in V P, we get equality. 
Another important property of σ-centered forcing is it’s productivity. Unlike c.c.c
posets which are not necessarily productive, σ-centered posets are productive in a rather
strong manner:
Lemma 3.6. Let 〈Pα | α < λ〉 for some λ <
(
2ℵ0
)+
be a collection of σ-centered posets.
Let P =
∏
α<λ Pα be the finite support product of 〈Pα | α < λ〉. Then P is also σ-centered.
3
To prove this we would need the following lemma (theorem 3 in [3]):
2The proof of this lemma is an elaboration of an answer on Math Stack Exchange at http://math.
stackexchange.com/q/1766520
3The proof of this lemma was extracted from the answers of Andreas Blass and Stefan Geschke on Math
Overflow at http://mathoverflow.net/q/84124
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Lemma 3.7. If λ <
(
2ℵ0
)+
then there is a function F : λ × ω → ω such that for
every α1,..., αl < λ, a1,..., al < ω there is some n < ω such that F (αi, n) = ai for all
i = 1,..., l.
Proof of lemma 3.6. For each α < λ let Pα =
⋃
n<ω P
n
α .
Let F : λ× ω → ω be a function as in lemma 3.7, and set
Qn =
{
p ∈ P | ∀α < λ
(
p (α) ∈ PF (α,n)α
)}
.
First we claim that P =
⋃
n<ω Qn. Let p ∈ P, and assume α1,..., αl < λ are the only
ones where p (α) 6= 1Pα . Let ki < ω be such that p (αi) ∈ P
ki
αi . Let n be such that
F (αi, n) = ki for i = 1,..., l. So p (αi) ∈ P
F (αi,n)
αi for every i = 1,..., l, and for every
other α we have p (α) = 1Pα ∈ P
F (α,n)
α (by the assumption in remark 3.2), so p ∈ Qn.
Second we claim that each Qn is centered. Let p1,..., pl ∈ Qn. For every α < λ, if
there is some i such that pi (α) 6= 1Pα , we define q (α) to be some common extension
of p1 (α) ,..., pl (α) in Pα, which exists since P
F (α,n)
α is centered. Otherwise we take
q (α) = 1Pα . Only finitely many α’s will give us q (α) 6= 1Pα , so indeed q ∈ P, and it is
clear that it is a common extension of p1,..., pl. 
The two-step iteration of σ-centered posets is also σ-centered:4
Lemma 3.8. If P is a σ-centered posets and Q˙ is a P-name such that P forces that Q˙ is a
σ-centered posets, then also P ∗ Q˙ is σ-centered.
Proof. Let P =
⋃
n<ω Pn such that each Pn is centered. By remark 3.2 we assume that
each Pn is upward closed. By the assumption, there are P-names Q˙n such that 1P forces
that Q˙ =
⋃
n<ω Q˙n and each Q˙n is centered. Let
An,m =
{
〈p, τ〉 ∈ P ∗ Q˙ | ∃q ∈ Pn
(
q ≤ p ∧ q  τ ∈ Q˙m
)}
.
• P ∗ Q˙ =
⋃
n,m<ω An,m: If 〈p, τ〉 ∈ P ∗ Q˙, since p  Q˙ =
⋃
n<ω Q˙n and by the
definition of the iteration p  τ ∈ Q˙, there is some q ≤ p s.t. q  τ ∈ Q˙m for
somem < ω. In addition there is some n s.t. q ∈ Pn, therefore 〈p, τ〉 ∈ An,m.
• Each An,m is centered: Let 〈pi, τi〉 ∈ An,m for i = 1,..., k and let qi  τi ∈ Q˙m.
Since Pn is centered we can take a common extension q ∈ P of the qi’s. So
q  τi ∈ Q˙m for each i and also q forces that Q˙m is centered, so it forces that
there a common extension for them. So there is some name τ such that q forces
that τ is a common extension of all the τi’s in Q˙. In particular q  τ ∈ Q˙ so
〈q, τ〉 ∈ P ∗ Q˙ and by definition it extends each 〈pi, τi〉.
So indeed P ∗ Q˙ is a countable union of centered posets as required. 
Note that this shows that Γσ−centered, the class of all σ-centered forcing notions, is
transitive. It is also reflexive since the trivial forcing is trivially σ-centered, and persistent
since being the union of countably many centered subsets is an upward absolute notion.
So, using theorem 2.8, we have the following:
Theorem 3.9. The ZFC-provable principles of σ-centered forcing contain S4.2.
4Actually something stronger is true - similarly to the previous proof, it is shown by Andreas Blass at http://
mathoverflow.net/q/84129 that the iteration with finite support of less than
(
2
ℵ0
)+
σ-centered posets is
again σ-centered. We however do not need this fact here.
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Finally, it will be of use to know that essentially, σ-centered forcing notions are
“small”, so there aren’t too many of them:
Lemma 3.10. Let P be a σ-centered forcing notion. Then the separative quotient of P is of
size at most 2ℵ0 .
Proof. Let P =
⋃
n∈ω Pn. Again we assume that each Pn is upward closed. Recall that
the separative quotient is the quotient of P by the equivalence relation: x, y ∈ P, x ∼ y
iff {z ∈ P | z ‖ x} = {z ∈ P | z ‖ y}. We denote the equivalence class of x by [x]. Define
for every x ∈ P
A (x) = {n ∈ ω | x ∈ Pn} .
We claim that for every x, y ∈ P, [x] 6= [y] implies A (x) 6= A (y). [x] 6= [y] means
that (WLoG) there is some z ‖ x such that z⊥y. Let z′ be a common extension of z
and x. So z′⊥y as well (otherwise z would be compatible with y). Let n ∈ ω such that
z′ ∈ Pn. Since we assumed Pn is upward closed, also x ∈ Pn, so n ∈ A (x). Assume
towards contradiction that n ∈ A (y), i.e. y ∈ Pn. But Pn is centered, so y and z′ must
be compatible, which is a contradiction.
So we get that |P/∼| ≤ |{A (x) | x ∈ P}| ≤ |P (ω)| = 2ℵ0 . 
Corollary 3.11. Up to forcing-equivalence, there are at most 22
ℵ0
σ-centered forcing no-
tions.
Proof. Every poset is forcing equivalent to it’s separative quotient (cf. pages 204-206 in
[8]), and by the previous lemma there are at most 22
ℵ0
of those. 
3.2. Almost disjoint forcing. In this section we present one of the tools for labeling
frames with σ-centered forcing - almost disjoint forcing, which is a version of the exam-
ple introduced in the previous section. The results in this section are due to Jensen and
Solovay in [9].
Two infinite sets are called almost disjoint (a.d.) if their intersection is finite. We
would like to have a way to construct almost disjoint subsets of ω in a very definable
and absolute way. For that, we fix some recursive enumeration {si | i < ω} of all finite
sequences of ω, and define for every f : ω → ω
S (f) = {i < ω | si is an initial segment of f} .
If f, g are distinct then S (f) and S (g) are almost disjoint. Hence, {S (f) | f : ω → ω}
is a family of 2ℵ0 pairwise a.d. subsets of ω.
Recall that for every Y ⊆ P (ω), PY is the forcing notion consisting of pairs 〈s, t〉
where s is a finite subset of ω and t a finite subset of Y , and 〈s′, t′〉 extends 〈s, t〉 if
s ⊆ s′, t ⊆ t′ and ∀A ∈ t, s ∩ A = s′ ∩ A.
From the discussion at section 2.4 of [9] we obtain the following:
Theorem 3.12. Let F ∈ M be a family of a.d. subsets of ω, and Y ⊆ F (in M ). Then
forcing with PY adds a real x such that for every y ∈ F , x ∩ y is finite iff y ∈ Y .
So PY adds a generic real xwhich is almost-disjoint from each member of Y . Further-
more, if x is obtained by the generic filter G, then clearly M [G] = M [x]. This gives us
a method to code subsets of 2ω using subsets of ω. LetM be some model of ZFC, set as
before a recursive enumeration {si} of ω
<ω and an enumeration {fα | α < κ} ∈ M of
ωω (where κ = (2ω)
M
), and define F = {S (fα) | α < κ}. So for each A ⊆ κ, A ∈ M ,
we can define Y = Y (A) = {S (fα) | α ∈ A}, and force with PY to obtain a generic
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real x = xA. So by the previous theorem, α ∈ A iff S (fα) ∈ Y iff x ∩ S (fα) is finite.
So, inM [x], we get that
A = {α < κ | S (fα) ∩ x is finite}
(note that PY preserves both cardinals and the continuum, so κ = (2ω)
M [x]
, and if
κ = ℵMα for some α, then also κ = ℵ
M [x]
α ). In this case, we say that “x codes A”.
4. Labeling frames with σ-centered forcing
Our goal in this section will be to prove that the modal logic of σ-centered forcing is
contained in S4.2. Recall that our method for that is labeling finite pre-Boolean-algebras
(theorem 2.11). In theorem 2.13 we have shown that a labeling can be produced by finding
arbitrarily large families of independent buttons, which are independent of an n-switch
for some large enough n. Our proof here will be modeled on that proof, although we will
not actually find such families. We begin by describing a specific model W which will
be our ground model, then construct an independent family of buttons and two different
n-switches. Like in the proof of theorem 2.13, given some finite pBA, we will use the
buttons to label the position in the quotient BA, and the n-switches to label the position
within each cluster. The difference will be that we use one n-switch t label clusters below
the top cluster of the BA, and the other for the top cluster. The need for this modification
will be explained in due time.
4.1. The ground model. We begin with the constructible universe L, and use Cohen
forcing to obtain mutually generic reals
〈
aα,i | α < ω
L
1 , i < ω
〉
i.e. each aβ,j is generic
over L
[〈
aα,i | α < ω
L
1 , i < ω, (α, i) 6= (β, j)
〉]
. Let
Z = L
[〈
aα,i | α < ω
L
1 , i < ω
〉]
.
Our ground modelW is a generic extension of Z , which preserves the mutual genericity
of
〈
aα,i | α < ω
L
1 , i < ω
〉
, such that these reals are ordinal-definable with a definition
which is absolute for generic extensions of W by σ-centered forcing. This can be done
e.g. by using Easton forcing to code the reals in the power function above some large
enough cardinal. Any extension of W for which the above definition is absolute will
be called an appropriate extension. We will also require that in W we do not collapse
cardinals and add no new subsets below ℵω , so e.g. ω
L
1 = ω
W
1 . From now on we’ll
deal with forcings which do not collapse cardinals (by c.c.c), and also do not change the
continuum (by lemma 3.5), so we omit such superscripts.
4.2. The buttons. Now overW we can define Ti, for i < ω, as the statement:
For every real x and for all but boundedly many α < ω1, aα,i is Cohen
generic over L [x, 〈aβ,j | β < ω1, j 6= i〉].
Since the reals aα,i and the sequences 〈aβ,j | β < ω1, j 6= i〉 are ordinal definable in W
and it’s appropriate extensions, also L [x, 〈aβ,j | β < ω1, j 6= i〉] is definable with x as
a parameter. So, formally, Ti includes the definitions of these elements, which will be
interpreted as we expect in all relevant models. The question whether a real r is generic
over some definable submodel is also expressible in the language of set theory, as it just
means that r is in every open dense subset of ωω which is in that model. So Ti is indeed
a sentence in the language of set theory. Note that if we want, by slight abuse of notation
we can treat i as a “variable” denoting a natural number, rather than a definable term;
thus we would be able to phrase sentences such as ∀i < ω Ti. This will be used in the
next section. In this section when we talk about a specific Ti, we take i to be a fixed term.
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Remark 4.1. (1) W  Ti for every i: We required that we do not add any new subsets
of ωω or any new real. So every real x ∈ W is already in Z . Fix some i < ω and
a real x ∈ W . This real was introduced by at most boundedly many aα,i, that is,
there is some γ < ω1 such that
x ∈ L [〈aα,j | α < ω1, j 6= i〉 ∪ 〈aα,i | α < γ〉] .
All the reals aα,i for α > γ are generic over the above model so also above
L [x, 〈aβ,j | β < ω1, j 6= i〉] .
(2) ¬Ti is a pure button for appropriate extensions: if for some aα,i there is some real
x such that aα,i is not generic over L [x, 〈aβ,j | β < ω1, j 6= i〉], then it will never
again be generic over this model. So, if we destroy Ti, we can never get it back as
long as it keeps it’s above meaning. Note that if an extension is not appropriate,
then Ti might have a completely different meaning than what is intended, as the
definitions we use will give some different sets, so it is paramount we stick with
appropriate extensions.
We will now define forcing notions which will allow us to destroy Ti, by destroying
the genericity of the relevant aα,i’s.
Definition 4.2. InW , we define Pi to be the forcing notion with conditions of the form
{Us1 ,..., Usn , aα1,i,..., aαl,i}where n, l < ω and Usk ⊆ ω
ω are basic open (see definition
2.1), and for conditions p, q ∈ Pi, q ≤ p iff p ⊆ q and whenever aα,i ∈ p and Us ∈ qrp,
aα,i /∈ Us. That is, to extend a condition, we can add any finite number of the reals, and
we can add any finite number of basic open sets, as long as the new sets do not include
any of the old reals.
We will show that the forcing Pi destroys the genericity of all the aα,i’s, by adding
dense open sets (approximated by the Us’s) that do not include them. So, intuitively, a
condition p = {Us1 ,..., Usn , aα1,i,..., aαl,i} states which reals will be avoided in subse-
quent stages.
Remark 4.3. Given some distinct aα1,i,..., aαl,i, we can always find some s such that
aα1,i,..., aαl,i /∈ Us: let t =
⋂l
k=1 aαk,i, i.e. the longest initial segment common to
aα1,i,..., aαl,i . Assume t is of length n, and take some j ∈ ωr{aα1,i (n) ,..., aαl,i (n)}.
Set s = t⌢ 〈j〉, then aα1,i,..., aαl,i /∈ Us.
Let G ⊆ Pi be a generic filter. Note that by the former remark, the set of conditions
having at least n basic-open sets in them is dense in Pi (given a condition p, we can
find an s such that Us does not contain any of the reals in p, and then add to p, e.g.,
Us, Us⌢〈0〉, Us⌢〈0,0〉... to obtain an extension with at least n basic-open sets). So, the
conditions in G give us an infinite sequence 〈Usn | n < ω〉 of basic-open sets.
Lemma 4.4. For every k < ω, the set
⋃
n≥k Usn is open-dense in ω
ω .
Proof. It is clearly open as a union of open sets. Let s ∈ ω<ω , denote by N the maximal
length of s0,..., sk−1 and let Ds,N = {p ∈ Pi | ∃t D s (ℓ (t) > N ∧ Ut ∈ p)}. It is open-
dense in Pi: open is clear, dense since if p = {Ut1 ,..., Utn , aα1,i,..., aαl,i} is not in Ds,N ,
as in remark 4.3 take t =
⋂l
k=1 aαk,i, if s 5 t then already any extension of s is a
legitimate addition to p, so we choose some s′ D s with ℓ (s′) > N and then p∪{Us′} ∈
Ds,N ; otherwise we take s
′ = t⌢ 〈j〉 as in the remark, extend it to some s′′ with ℓ (s′′) >
N and p ∪ {Us′′} ∈ Ds,N .
So there is some p ∈ G ∩ Ds,N , and some Us′ ∈ p witnessing that. p ∈ G so
Us′ ∈ 〈Usn | n < ω〉, and since ℓ (s
′) > N , by the definition of N s′ = sn for some
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n ≥ k, so Us′ appears in
⋃
n≥k Usn . Hence s is extended by some member of
⋃
n≥k Usn .
This was for any s, so
⋃
n≥k Usn is indeed dense. 
Lemma 4.5. For every α < ω1 there is some k such that aα,i /∈
⋃
n≥k Usn .
Proof. Fix α < ω1 and let Dα = {p ∈ Pi | aα,i ∈ p}. So Dα is clearly open, and it is
dense since for every p, p ∪ {aα,i} is a legitimate extension of p (we did not limit the
addition of aβ,i’s). So there is some p ∈ G ∩ Dα. Let k be larger than any n such that
Usn ∈ p. We want to show that aα,i /∈
⋃
n≥k Usn . Otherwise, there is some n ≥ k such
that aα,i ∈ Usn . So there is some q ∈ G with Usn ∈ q, and by moving to a common
extension (since G is a filter) we can assume q ≤ p. In fact, q < p, since Usn /∈ p by
the choice of k and n. But aα,i ∈ p, q < p and Usn ∈ qrp imply that aα,i /∈ Usn , by
contradiction. 
So indeed, Pi adds open-dense sets which destroy the genericity of every aα,i. This
will show that Ti is destroyed, once we show that Ti still means the same thing after
forcing with Pi.
Lemma 4.6. Pi is σ-centered.
Proof. For every t1,..., tn ∈ ω
<ω , let P (t1,..., tn) be the set of all conditions in Pi con-
taining exactly the basic-open sets Ut1 ,..., Utn . Note that there are only ω such sets
{t1,..., tn}, and that clearly Pi =
⋃
t1,...,tn∈ω<ω
P (t1,..., tn). Now notice that every
P (t1,..., tn) is centered, since if p1,..., pl ∈ P (t1,..., tn), then p1 ∪ · · · ∪ pl is still a
legitimate condition in Pi, and it extends each pj since the only limitation on extension
concerned the basic-open sets, which we did not change. 
Corollary 4.7. Let W ′ be some appropriate extension of W . Let G ⊆ Pi be generic over
W ′. ThenW ′ [G]  ¬Ti
Proof. Note that by σ-centeredness, after forcing with Pi the meaning of all the def-
initions in Ti remain the same. So we will find a real x ∈ W
′ [G] such that all the
aα,i’s are already not generic over L [x], so surely Ti fails. Let 〈ti | i < ω〉 ∈ L be some
definable enumeration of ω<ω . Define x = {m | ∃p ∈ G (Utm ∈ p)}. So, if as before
〈Usn | n < ω〉 is the sequence of basic-open sets given by G, then it is equivalent to
〈Utm | m ∈ x〉 by some rearranging of the order. So in L [x] we can already define each
union
⋃
n≥k Usn . Hence, as we have shown above, each aα,i is not in some dense-open
set of ωω in L [x], and therefore not generic over L [x] as required. 
Our next task will be to show that forcing with some Pj does not affect the truth of
Ti for any i 6= j.
Lemma 4.8. Let W ′ be an appropriate extension of W , such that W ′  Ti. Let G ⊆ Pj
be generic over W ′ for j 6= i. Then W ′ [G]  Ti.
Proof. Assume otherwise. Then there is some x ∈ W ′ [G] such that unboudedly many
aα,i are not generic over L [x, 〈aβ,k | β < ω1, k 6= i〉]. Let x˙ ∈ W
′ be a Pj-name for x.
Since x is a real, we can assume that x˙ is a name containing only elements of the form
〈q, nˇ〉 for n ∈ ω and q ∈ Pj . Furthermore, since Pj is c.c.c, we can assume that there
are only countably many elements of the form 〈q, nˇ〉 for each n. So x˙ is a countable
collection of elements of the form 〈q, nˇ〉. We wish to “code” x˙ by some real y ∈ W ′. We
do this in the usual way:
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• Let γ be the supremum of all α < ω1 such that aα,j ∈ q for some 〈q, nˇ〉 ∈ x˙.
Since x˙ is countable and each such q contains only finitely many aα,j ’s, γ < ω1.
• Each q ∈ Pj is of the form {Us1 ,..., Usn , aα1,j ,..., aαl,j}, so it is determined by
a finite subset of ω<ω and a finite subset of ordinals no larger than γ. This
information can be coded by a finite sequence of natural numbers zq (e.g. a
sequence s is coded by 3s(0) · 5s(1) · · · p
s(ℓ(s)−1)
ℓ(s) where pm is the m-th prime
number, and fixing some bijection f : γ → ω we code aα,j using 2
f(α)+1).
• Each pair 〈zq, nˇ〉 can be coded by a natural number (e.g. if ℓ (zq) = m then by
2n · 3zq(0) · · · p
zq(m−1)
ℓ(zq)
)
• So the entire x˙ can be coded by a set of natural numbers y. All these codings are
done inW ′ so y ∈ W ′.
Now assume thatW ′[G] “aα,i is not generic overM
′ := L [x, 〈aβ,k | β < ω1, k 6= i〉]”.
We’ll show that alreadyW ′ “aα,i is not generic overM := L [y, 〈aβ,k | β < ω1, k 6= i〉]”.
M ⊆ W ′, and since the definition of Pj requires only the reals 〈aβ,j | β < ω1〉, Pj ∈
M . In addition, since we can decode y in this model, we have x˙ ∈ M . Since Pj ∈ M ⊆
W ′, G is generic also overM . The fact that aα,i is not generic overM
′ means that there
is a dense open set U ∈ M ′ such that in W ′[G], aα,i /∈ U . Since x˙ ∈ M , M
′ ⊆ M [G],
so U ∈ M [G] ⊆ W ′[G]. So there is some p ∈ G and some Pj-name U˙ ∈ M such that
p  “U˙ is an open-dense subset of ωω , and aˇα,i /∈ U˙”. Define
U¯ =
{
r ∈ ωω | ∃p′ ≤ p
(
p′  rˇ ∈ U˙
)}
.
So U¯ ∈M . We claim first that U¯ is open-dense.
Open: let r ∈ U¯ , witnessed by p′ ≤ p s.t. p′  rˇ ∈ U˙ . Since p′ also forces that U˙
is open, there is some p′′ ≤ p′ and some s ∈ ω<ω such that p′′  “rˇ ∈ Us ⊆ U˙”, that
is p′′  sˇ E rˇ ∧
(
sˇ E r˙′ → r˙′ ∈ U˙
)
. The initial segment relation does not change, so
s E r. If r′ ∈ Us, then in particular we’ll get p
′′  rˇ′ ∈ U˙ , so by definition r′ ∈ U¯ . So
Us ⊆ U¯ . So U¯ is open.
Dense: Let s ∈ ω<ω. Since p forces that U˙ is open-dense, there is some p′ ≤ p and
some t D s such that p′ 
(
tˇ E r˙→ r˙ ∈ U˙
)
. So let some t E r ∈ ωω , then in particular
we get p′  rˇ ∈ U˙ , so r ∈ U¯ and r D s as required.
Second, we claim that in W ′, aα,i /∈ U¯ . Otherwise, there is some p
′ ≤ p such that
p′  aˇα,i ∈ U˙ . But p was a condition forcing aˇα,i /∈ U˙ , a contradiction.
So, we have found an open-dense set U¯ ∈M such that aα,i /∈ U¯ , so aα,i is not generic
over M . This was for every aα,i not generic over L [x, 〈aβ,k | β < ω1, k 6= i〉], and we
assumed there are unboundedly many of these. So there are unboundedly many aα,i’s
which are not generic over M = L [y, 〈aβ,k | β < ω1, k 6= i〉], where y ∈ W
′. But this
contradicts the assumption thatW ′  Ti. So, we indeed get that alsoW
′ [G]  Ti. 
To conclude, packing up what we have done in this section, we obtain the following:
Theorem 4.9. {¬Ti | i < ω} is a family of independent buttons over W for σ-centered
forcing.
Remark 4.10. In fact, we can replace “σ-centered” with any every reflexive and transitive
class of forcing notions, containing all the Pi’s, such that every extension of W with a
forcing from the class yields an appropriate extension.
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Note that if it were the case that in no extension of W by σ-centered forcing all
these buttons are pushed, we could have finished the proof of our main theorem using
corollary 2.16. However, by lemma 3.6,
∏
i<ω Pi is σ-centered, and it pushes all the
buttons. Therefore we need something more to complete the proof.
4.3. The n-switches. In this section we would like to define an n-switch which is inde-
pendent of any finite number of the buttons from the previous section, using a construc-
tion similar to clause 2. of lemma 2.15. We begin with a construction which gives us
statements which are almost an n-switch, as they function only for specific extensions
of W . Then we build a second n-switch that will function for all other extensions, but
will not be independent of the buttons. In the next section we will show how to use both
constructions for our purpose.
Given an enumeration of some infinite number of the statements from the previous
section, 〈Ti | 0 < i < ω〉 (we can rename the statements as we want, and later we will use
this fact), define Rj (where j < ω) as the statement j = sup ({0 < i < ω | ¬Ti} ∪ {0})
(recall that we can use i as a “variable” in Ti). So R0 holds iff no button is pushed, and
if in some appropriate extension ofW we have Rj for j > 0, then in particular we have
¬Tj ∧ Tl for any l > j, and we can force with Pl to obtain exactly Rl. Additionally,
if some Rj holds, it means in particular that the number of pushed buttons is bounded.
Now, to define an n-switch, given some n > 1, we setΘj = ∃k < ω (Rk ∧ k mod n = j)
for any j < n. So in any appropriate extension ofW ′, if Θj holds for some j, this means
in particular that there is some k such that Rk holds, so for every j
′ < n we can find
k′ > k with k′ mod n = j′ and then force with Pk′ to obtain Rk′ and thus Θj′ . It is also
clear that no two distinctΘj ’s can hold at the same time, and that if the above supremum
is finite, then some Θj hold. So, {Θj | j < n} functions as an n-switch, but only as long
as the number of pushed buttons is bounded. If in some appropriate extension there are
unboundedly many buttons pushed (which is possible as we noted above), no Rk holds,
so also no Θj hold. So this is “almost” an n-switch.
We now define a “real” n-switch, which we will use in extensions where the number
of pushed buttons may be unbounded. The reason we don’t use only the following n-
switch is that it may not be independent from the buttons.
Proposition 4.11. Let W be the model constructed in the previous section. Then for every
n > 1 there is an n-switch for σ-centered forcing overW .
Proof. Recall that Z = L [〈aα,i | α < ω1, i < ω〉] and that in our construction of W we
required that all subsets of ω and of ω1 in W are already in Z (and in particular W 
2ℵ0 = ℵ1 andW  2
ℵ1 = ℵ2). Also note that using the coding of 〈aα,i | α < ω1, i < ω〉,
in all appropriate extensions ofW , sets in Z are definable from ordinals using sentences
of set-theory. So let 〈fα | α < ω1〉 ∈ Z be a definable enumeration of all the func-
tions f : ω → ω in Z (equivalently, inW ), and define yα = S (fα) as in section 3.2. Let
〈Aξ | ξ < ω2〉 ∈ Z be some fixed definable enumeration of all the subsets (in Z , or, equiv-
alently, inW ) of ω1. LetC (x, ξ) be the statement “x ⊆ ω and α ∈ Aξ ↔ x∩yα is finite”,
referred to as “x is a real codingAξ”. By the discussion at the end of section 3.2, for every
ξ there is a σ-centered forcing notion Qξ ∈ Z such thatQξ  ∃xC (x, ξ). We would like
to define a ratchet by letting r (α) be the statement α = sup {ξ < ω2 | ∃xC (x, ξ)}, and
use it to construct an n-switch as in lemma 2.15. By defining so, we can indeed always
increase the value of the r (α) by forcing with Qα. The problem is that in a certain ex-
tension, forcing with Qα might also add a real coding Aξ some ξ > α. To fix that, we
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will define an unbounded set E such that adding a code for Aα for some α ∈ E doesn’t
add a code for any larger Aξ .
We work now within W , and fix some σ-centered poset Q ∈ W . Let α < ω2. We
define by induction {αζ | ζ < ω1}. Set α0 = α. If αζ < ω2 is defined for ζ < ω1, let
αζ+1 = sup

β < ω2 | Q×
∏
ξ≤αζ
Qξ 1 ¬∃xC
(
x, βˇ
)

+ 1.
The above set is not empty since Qαζ  ∃xC (x, αˇζ). In particular, αζ < αζ+1.
Claim 4.12. αζ+1 < ω2.
Proof. We show that for any σ-centered forcing P ∈ W , there is some βP < ω2 such that
P  “ sup {β | ∃xC (x, β)} ≤ βP ”, i.e. P 
(
∃xC
(
x, βˇ
)
→ βˇ ≤ βˇP
)
. First of all, since
any σ-centered forcing preserves cardinals and also the continuum function, P  2ℵ1 =
ℵ2 > 2
ℵ0 . In particular, P  “ sup {β | ∃xC (x, β)} < ω2”, since there cannot be ℵ2
reals each coding a different subset of ω1. Note that there can only be ℵ0 many possible
values for sup {β | ∃xC (x, β)}: otherwise there would be uncountably many conditions
forcing different values for sup {β | ∃xC (x, β)}, therefore an uncountable antichain,
contradicting the c.c.c of P . Hence, since ω2 is regular, there is some βP bounding all
these possible values, so it is indeed forced by P that sup {β | ∃xC (x, β)} ≤ βP .
Now, taking P = Q×
∏
ξ≤αζ
Qξ (since αζ < ω2 =
(
2ℵ0
)+
, this is σ-centered by lemma
3.6), if for some γ, P 1 ¬∃xC (x, γˇ), then there is p ∈ P such that p  ∃xC (x, γˇ), but
also p  “ sup {β | ∃xC (x, β)} ≤ βP ” so p  γˇ ≤ βˇP < ωˇ2. Since the ordinals don’t
change, we indeed get γ ≤ βP . So by the definition, αζ+1 ≤ βP + 1 < ω2. 
For ζ < ω1 limit, set αζ = sup {αξ | ξ < ζ} (ω2 is regular so also in this case αζ <
ω2), and finally let α
∗ = sup {αζ | ζ < ω1}. Again since ω2 is regular, α
∗ < ω2.
Claim 4.13. Let G be generic for Q = Q×
∏
ξ<α∗
Qξ such thatW [G]  ∃xC (x, β). Then
β < α∗.
Proof. Let x ∈ W [G] such that W [G]  C (x, β). So there is a Q-name τ and some
p∗ ∈ G which forces C
(
τ, βˇ
)
. For every n, let Cn ⊆ Q be a maximal antichain below
p∗ of conditions deciding the statement nˇ ∈ τ . By the c.c.c each Cn is countable, so also
C =
⋃
n∈ω Cn is countable. Every element of Q is of the form 〈q, (pγ)γ<α∗〉 where only
for finitely many γ’s pγ 6= 1Qγ . So for each p ∈ A, denote this finite set of ordinals by
Fp, and let γ
∗ = sup
⋃
p∈A Fp. Each Fp is a set of ordinals less than α
∗, so γ∗ ≤ α∗.
But since C is countable and each Fp is finite, γ
∗ has at most countable cofinality, while
α∗ is the limit of an increasing ω1 sequence 〈αζ | ζ < ω1〉, so γ
∗ < α∗, and furthermore,
there is some ζ < ω1 such that γ
∗ ≤ αζ . Let Q¯ = Q ×
∏
ξ≤αζ
Qξ . For every p ∈ Q, if
p = 〈q, (pγ)γ<α∗〉, let p¯ = 〈q, (pγ)γ≤αζ 〉, and let G¯ = {p¯ | p ∈ G}. G¯ is Q¯-generic over
W . We claim that x ∈ W
[
G¯
]
andW
[
G¯
]
 C (x, β). Define the Q¯-name
σ¯ =
⋃
n∈ω
(
{p¯ | p ∈ Cn, p  nˇ ∈ τ} × {nˇ}
)
.
Remark. By the choice of αζ ≥ γ
∗, for every p ∈ Cn, if it is of the form 〈q, (pγ)γ<α∗〉,
then pγ = 1 for every γ > αζ .
18 UR BEN-ARI-TISHLER
If n ∈ x then there is some p ∈ G, p ≤ p∗ that forces nˇ ∈ τ . By the maximality of Cn,
it intersects G, which is a filter, so a condition in the intersection must also force nˇ ∈ τ
(and not nˇ /∈ τ ). So we can choose such p ∈ Cn ∩ G, and by definition 〈p¯, nˇ〉 ∈ σ¯. In
addition, p¯ ∈ G¯, so n ∈ σ¯G¯.
If n ∈ σ¯G¯ there is some p ∈ Cn, p  nˇ ∈ τ such that p¯ ∈ G¯. So, there is some r ∈ G
such that r¯ = p¯. Note that by the remark r and p are equal in every coordinate where p
is not trivial, so r ≤ p. Therefore also r  nˇ ∈ τ , and r ∈ G so n ∈ x.
So, we get that σ¯G¯ = x, so x ∈ W
[
G¯
]
. W
[
G¯
]
⊆ W [G], and in W [G] we have
C (x, β), i.e.
Aβ = {α | x ∩ yα is finite} ,
so we can already have this equation inW
[
G¯
]
(since the yα’s don’t change), soW
[
G¯
]

C (x, β). Therefore, we have that Q ×
∏
ξ≤αζ
Qξ 1 ¬∃xC (x, β), so by the definition of
αζ+1, β ≤ αζ+1 < α
∗, as required. 
So we have defined an operation α 7→ α∗ for every α < ω2 (note that this operation
was relative to Q). Since ∀α < ω2 we have α < α
∗ < ω2, the set {α
∗ | α < ω2} is
unbounded in ω2, so the set CQ consisting of all limit points of this set is a club.
By corollary 3.11, in W there are at most (22
ℵ0
)W σ-centered forcing notions up to
equivalence, or to be exact, at most (22
ℵ0
)W separative forcing notions. As we noted
before, this cardinal is ℵ2. Note that
{∏
α<ξ Qξ | ξ ∈ CQ
}
where Q is the trivial forcing
are non-equivalent σ-centered posets, so we get exactly ℵ2 posets. Since every separative
σ-centered poset has size at most ℵ1, each can be coded as binary relations on ω1, so we
can assume all such forcings in W are already in Z . Let 〈Qζ | ζ < ω2〉 ∈ Z be some
definable enumeration of all the separative σ-centered forcing notions inW , and define
C as be the diagonal intersection of
〈
CQζ | ζ < ω2
〉
:
C := △
ζ<ω2
CQζ =

α < ω2 | α ∈
⋂
ζ<α
CQζ

 .
C is also a club in ω2 (cf. lemma 8.4 in [8]). Now we let
E = C ∩ {α < ω2 | cf (α) = ω1} .
E is unbounded: it is known that the set {α < ω2 | cf (α) = ω1} is stationary in ω2
(cf. pg. 94 in [8]), so it intersects the club {α ∈ C | α > γ} for each γ < ω2. Let
〈eα | α < ω2〉 ∈ Z be a (definable) ascending enumeration of E .
Remark. We would have preferred to work with C rather than E . The problem is that
the ∗ operation may not be continuous at limits of countable cofinality - to prove conti-
nuity, we would like to imitate the proof of claim 4.13, but it requires that the limit is of
uncountable cofinality. If the length of the product is of countable cofinality, there might
be a real that is not introduced in any bounded product.
Now we can define r (α) as the statement “α = min {β < ω2 | ¬∃xC (x, eβ)}”. These
are indeed statements, since the eβ’s are definable over Z = L [〈aα,i | α < ω1, i < ω〉],
which is definable in W using the decoding of the generic reals. Again note that this
definition retains it’s intended meaning in every appropriate extension ofW . Now given
n > 1, define Φj (for j < n) as the statement “r (ω · α+ k) → (k mod n = j)”. We
claim that {Φj | j < n} is an n-switch for σ-centered forcing overW .
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Let Q ∈ W be some σ-centered poset, and G ⊆ Q generic over W . By lemma
3.5 W [G] satisfies 2ℵ0 = ℵ1, so in particular the set {β < ω2 | ∃xC (x, eβ)}
W [G]
is
bounded, since there are only ω1 reals, and therefore there cannot be unboundedly many
subsets of ω1 coded by them. So there is some unique γ < ω2 such that W [G]  r (γ).
There are some unique j, k < n such that γ = ω · α + k and k mod n = j, so W [G] 
Φj . Hence every σ-centered extension of W satisfies exactly one Φj . Now we need to
show that for every j′ 6= j there is some σ-centered extension of W [G] satisfying Φj′ .
Recall the club CQ from the above construction. Q = Qξ for some ξ < ω2. By the
unboundedness of E , we can find some γ′ such that eγ′ > ξ and γ
′ = ω ·α+ j′ for some
α. We want to show that we have a generic extension ofW [G] satisfying r (γ′).
Let H ⊆
∏
ζ<eγ′
Qζ be generic over W [G]. By the product lemma, W [G×H ] =
W [G] [H ] andG×H isQ×
∏
ζ<eγ′
Qζ generic overW . For every β < eγ′ ,
∏
ζ<eγ′
Qζ 
∃xC (x, β), so W [G] [H ]  ∃xC (x, β). Recall that eγ′ is in the diagonal intersec-
tion of the clubs CQζ , so by definition, and since eγ′ > ξ, eγ′ ∈
⋂
ζ<eγ′
CQζ ⊆ CQξ .
So, by the definition of CQξ , eγ′ is either of the form δ
∗ for some δ and the ∗ oper-
ation corresponding to Qξ , or a limit point of such points. In the first case, we can
just apply claim 4.13. In the second case, since eγ′ ∈ E is of uncountable cofinality,
we can repeat the proof of claim 4.13 with a sequence 〈δ∗ζ | ζ < ω1〉 that witnesses
eγ′ ∈ CQξ , and get that the statement in claim 4.13 is true as well. That is, in both
cases, we get that if W [G×H ]  ∃xC (x, β) then β < eγ′ . So eγ′ is the first β such
that W [G×H ]  ¬∃xC (x, β). Since the enumeration of E is increasing, we get that
γ′ = min {β < ω2 | ¬∃xC (x, eβ)}. So W [G×H ]  r (γ
′), and since γ′ = ω · α + j′,
W [G×H ]  Φj′ as required. 
The forcing notions used in this n-switch add real numbers in a rather uncontrollable
way, so it is indeed likely that they might add some real which destroys the genericity of
the aα,i’s, therefore it is unlikely that this n-switch is independent of the buttons ¬Ti.
However, by using both constructions presented in this section, we can overcome the
drawbacks each of them has.
4.4. The labeling.
Theorem 4.14. There is a σ-centered labeling for every finite pre-Boolean-algebra.
Proof. Let 〈F,≤〉 be a pBA.WLoG, by adding dummyworlds, we can assume each cluster
in F contains n elements for some 1 < n < ω 5. LetB be a finite set such that 〈F/≡,≤〉
is isomorphic to 〈P (B) ,⊆〉. So every world in F is of the form wCj for some j < n and
C ⊆ B, and we have wCj ≤ w
C′
j′ iff C ⊆ C
′.
Let W be the model constructed in section 4.1. We can assume B ∈ W . Consider
the predicates Ti constructed in section 4.2, and rename them by choosing some Tb for
every b ∈ B, and renaming the rest as 〈Ti | 0 < i < ω〉. We will refer to these as the
T -predicates. For each b ∈ B and 0 < i < ω let Pb and Pi be the corresponding forcing
notions destroying Tb and Ti respectively. Let {Θj | j < n} be statements constructed as
in the beginning of section 4.3 from 〈Ti | 0 < i < ω〉, and {Φj | j < n} be the n-switch
constructed in proposition 4.11.
5If every cluster has only one element then this proof is a bit redundant, as we don’t need the n-switches, and
we can label the BA only with the buttons from section 4.2.
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For every C ⊆ B, define
ΨC =
∧
b∈C
¬Tb ∧
∧
b/∈C
Tb
which states that the pushed buttons out of {¬Tb | b ∈ B} are exactly the ones labeled
by elements in C .
Now for every C ( B and j < n we set Φ
(
wCj
)
= ΨC ∧Θj . For C = B and j < n,
we set
Φ
(
wBj
)
= (ΨB ∧Θj) ∨ [(sup {n | ¬Tn} = ω) ∧ Φj ] .
So, each cluster is labeled using the independent buttons {¬Tb | b ∈ B}, and to move
within each cluster below the topmost one we use the “almost” n-switch {Θj | j < n}.
If we can no longer use it, that is, if there are unboundedly many Ti’s destroyed, we put
ourselves in the top cluster, and there we move using the n-switch {Φj | j < n}. In this
way, the fact that this n-switch is not independent of the buttons will not affect us, as
we will always stay in the top cluster anyway. We will now show that this is indeed a
labeling as required.
The statements are mutually exclusive: It is clear that the statements {ΨC | C ⊆ B} are
mutually exclusive, so Φ
(
wCj
)
,Φ
(
wC
′
j′
)
for C 6= C′, both different than B, clearly
exclude each other. If we look at Φ
(
wCj
)
and Φ
(
wBj′
)
for some C 6= B, they ex-
clude each other since if Φ
(
wBj′
)
holds, then either ΨB holds which excludes ΨC , or
sup {n | ¬Tn} = ω holds, which excludesΘj . Now for j 6= j
′ ifC ( B,Φ
(
wCj
)
,Φ
(
wCj′
)
exclude each other sinceΘj andΘj′ exclude each other; and ifC=B, if sup {n | ¬Tn} =
ω holds then Φj and Φj′ exclude each other, and otherwise again Θj and Θj′ exclude
each other.
The statements exhaust the truth over σ-centered generic extensions of W : Let W [G] be
some σ-centered generic extension ofW . It is appropriate. IfW [G]  sup {n | ¬Tn} =
ω, then there is some j such that W [G]  Φj , and so W [G]  Φ
(
wBj
)
. Otherwise, the
number of buttons pushed is finite, so there is some j such that W [G]  Θj , and there
is also some specific subset of the buttons {¬Tb | b ∈ B}which are pushed in W [G], so
there is some C ⊆ B such thatW [G]  ΨC , and together we getW [G]  Φ
(
wCj
)
.
W satisfies Φ
(
w∅0
)
: InW we have Tb for all b ∈ B, soW  Ψ∅. Also all the Ti ’s hold,
so we have R0, and therefore alsoW  Φ0.
The statements correspond to the relation: Assume we are in U which is a σ-centered
forcing extension ofW where Φ
(
wCj
)
is true.
Assume first that C 6= B.
• Assume ♦Φ
(
wC
′
j′
)
. That means there is a σ-centered generic extension U ′ of U
satisfying Φ
(
wC
′
j′
)
. If C′ 6= B then
U ′  ΨC′ =
∧
b∈C′
¬Tb ∧
∧
b/∈C′
Tb.
But U 
∧
b∈C ¬Tb, which are buttons, so they remain pushed in U
′, i.e. U ′ ∧
b∈C ¬Tb. So we must get C ⊆ C
′, so wCj ≤ w
C′
j′ . If C
′ = B then clearly we
have wCj ≤ w
C′
j′ .
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• Assume wCj ≤ w
C′
j′ , hence C ⊆ C
′. We have
U  ΨC =
∧
b∈C
¬Tb ∧
∧
b/∈C
Tb,
so for every b ∈ C′rC , we can force ¬Tb, to obtain an extension U ′ satisfying
ΨC′ (the buttons from C will remain pushed). In U , which satisfies Θj , there
is some k such that k mod n = j and U  Rk . In U
′ we still have Rk, since
pushing buttons of the form ¬Tb does not push any button ¬Ti. If j
′ = j we are
done, otherwise we can find some k′ > k, such that k′ mod n = j′, push ¬Tk′
and thus obtain an extension U ′′ satisfyingΘj′ . Again this forcing does not affect
the Tb’s, so U
′′ also satisfies ΨC′ , so it satisfies Φ
(
wC
′
j′
)
. By transitivity, we get
that indeed U  ♦Φ
(
wC
′
j′
)
.
Now assume C = B, i.e. U  Φ
(
wBj
)
. We distinguish the two cases.
• First, we assume U  (ΨB ∧Θj)
– Assume ♦Φ
(
wC
′
j′
)
. Since U  ΨB , any extension of it also satisfies ΨB , so
we cannot have ♦Φ
(
wC
′
j′
)
for any C′ 6= B. Therefore C′ = B and indeed
wBj ≤ w
B
j′ = w
C′
j′ .
– Assume wCj ≤ w
C′
j′ . So C
′ = B as well. U  Θj , so as we have seen
before, we can force over U to obtain a generic extension satisfying Θj′ .
This extension will still satisfy ΨB since these are buttons, so it will satisfy
Φ
(
wBj′
)
as required.
• Second assume U  (sup {n | ¬Tn} = ω) ∧Φj .
– Assume ♦Φ
(
wC
′
j′
)
. Since U  sup {n | ¬Tn} = ω, any extension of it
also satisfies sup {n | ¬Tn} = ω since these are buttons, so we cannot have
♦Φ
(
wC
′
j′
)
for any C′ 6= B. Therefore C′ = B and indeed wBj ≤ w
C′
j′ .
– Assume wCj ≤ w
C′
j′ . So C
′ = B as well. U  Φj , so as we have seen
before, we can force over U to obtain a generic extension satisfying Φj′ .
This extension will still satisfy sup {n | ¬Tn} = ω since these are buttons,
so it will satisfy Φ
(
wBj′
)
as required.
Hence we have defined a σ-centered labeling for the frame 〈F,≤〉 overW . 
Corollary 4.15. If ZFC is consistent, then the ZFC-provable principles of σ-centered
forcing are exactly S4.2.
Proof. If ZFC is consistent then we can obtain the modelW and the labelings described
above. So by theorem 2.11 the ZFC-provable principles of σ-centered forcing are con-
tained in S4.2, and by theorem 3.9 we get equality. 
5. Generalizations and open questions
Throughout this work, we have focused on σ-centered forcing notions. However,
by examining the proofs, one can see that we have not used the full strength of σ-
centeredness. To obtain the lower bound, we used the reflexivity, transitivity and persis-
tence of σ-centered posets. And to obtain the upper bound, we defined labelings using
two main ingredients - the first is the posets constructed section 4.2, giving us the buttons
and an “almost” n-switch, and the second is the n-switch of proposition 4.11. To work
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with the buttons, we also required that all extensions of W will be appropriate. Assum-
ing this, once we had an n-switch, we did not use it’s specific construction in defining
the labeling. So in fact we have the following:
Theorem 5.1. Let W the model constructed in section 4.1 and Γ a class of forcing notions
with the following properties:
(1) Γ is reflexive, transitive and persistent;
(2) Every extension of W by a Γ-forcing is appropriate;
(3) All posets constructed in section 4.2 are in Γ;
(4) There is an n-switch for Γ-forcing over W for any n.
Then MLF (Γ) = S4.2.
Now let’s see what was needed to obtain the n-switch of proposition 4.11. We relied
heavily on the c.c.c of all posets in question; we used all posets coding subsets of ω1, as
well as products of at most ℵ1 of them; we relied on the fact that σ-centered posets can-
not enlarge 2ℵ0 or 2ℵ1 ; we used the fact that there were (inW ) only ℵ2 σ-centered posets
up to equivalence, and that they were all already in the smaller model Z . So, this con-
struction can be carried with any class of forcing notions satisfying these requirements.
To conclude:
Theorem 5.2. Let Γ be a class of forcing notions with the following properties:
(1) Γ is reflexive, transitive and persistent;
(2) Every extension ofW by a Γ-forcing is appropriate;
(3) All posets constructed in section 4.2 are in Γ;
(4.1) Each poset in Γ has the c.c.c, and does not enlarge 2ℵ0 or 2ℵ1 ;
(4.2) |Γ| ≤ 22
ℵ0
(where the size is measured up to equivalence of forcing);
(4.3) ΓW ⊆ Z ;
(4.4) All posets which are used to code subsets of ω1, and products of at most ℵ1 of them,
are in Γ.
Then MLF (Γ) = S4.2.
Remark. Conditions 3 and 4.4 will hold for any class containing all σ-centered forcing
notions.
Definition 5.3. A subset C ⊆ P is called n-linked if any n elements of C are compatible,
i.e. have a common extension (perhaps not in C itself). 2-linked is also called simply
linked. A poset is called σ-n-linked if it is the union of ω many n-linked subsets. Again,
σ-linked means σ-2-linked.
It is clear that we have the following implications:
σ-centered → σ-n-linked for every n → σ-n-linked → σ-linked
and it is known that the other directions do not hold (cf. [1]). So the classes of all forcing
notions satisfying one of these properties contain the class of σ-centered posets. We
observe that in the proofs of lemmas 3.5 and 3.10, we actually only used the fact that the
posets were σ-linked rather than strictly σ-centered. So each of these classes preserve
the continuum function, each such poset is equivalent to a poset of size at most 2ℵ0 , and
the class itself has size at most 22
ℵ0
(up to equivalence). Additionally, one can see that
the proofs of lemmas 3.6 (the strong productivity of the class) and 3.8 (the transitivity of
the class) can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the classes of σ-n-linked posets for some
n or the class of posets which are σ-n-linked for every n. These classes are also clearly
persistent, so they satisfy all the conditions of theorem 5.2, thus we obtain the following:
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Corollary 5.4. Let Γ be either the class of all σ-n-linked posets (for some fixed n), or the
class of all posets which are σ-n-linked for every n. Then MLF (Γ) = S4.2.
Parallel to this hierarchy of properties, we can define the following hierarchy (cf. [1]):
Definition 5.5. (1) Given n ∈ ω, P has property Kn if every A ⊆ [P]
ℵ1 contains an
uncountable n-linked subset. K2 is also called the Knaster property.
(2) P has pre-caliber ω1 if every A ⊆ [P]
ℵ1 contains an uncountable centered subset.
Note that pre-caliber ω1 implies propertyKn, andKn impliesKm form ≤ n. So these
form a hierarchy of properties. Furthermore, if P is σ-centered then it has pre-caliber ω1,
and if it is σ-n-linked then it has property Kn. So we get the following implications:
σ-centered //
((P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
∀n (σ-n-linked) // σ-n-linked //

σ-2-linked
%%❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏

pre-caliberω1 // Kn // K2 // c.c.c
Let the property P be either pre-caliber ω1 or Kn for some n, and denote by ΓP the
class of all P-forcing notions. Then one can verify that ΓP is reflexive, transitive and
persistent (hence directed), soMLF (ΓP) ⊇ S4.2. Furthermore, it contains all σ-centered
forcings, so it would be natural to try and generalize our results to this parallel hierarchy.
However, note that for every I , the poset Fn (I, 2) consisting of finite functions from I
to 2, ordered by reverse inclusion, has pre-caliber ω1 (cf. [11, pg. 181]), and for |I| > 2
ℵ0
it adds |I| new reals, so it does not preserve the continuum function. So extensions of
W using such forcings may not be appropriate. We can however get some limited result.
Note that the coding of the reals aα,i can be started as high as we want, so if we limit
ourselves to forcing notions of a bounded size, we can do this coding somewhere high
enough that will not be affected by these forcings. So we can proceed with this the
labeling, if we show that there is some n-switch to label the top cluster with. Since these
forcings do not preserve the continuum, we cannot obtain an n-switch for these classes
using the same methods. However, there is a very natural n-switch for any class of c.c.c
forcings which contain all forcings of the form Fn (I, 2): the statements 2ℵ0 ≥ ℵα form
a ratchet, since in any extension of the ground model, using an appropriate I , we can
always increase the size of the continuum, and by c.c.c it will not drop. If we bound the
size of the forcings appropriately, this would be a strong ratchet, and we can construct
an n-switch as in lemma 2.15. So all the conditions of theorem 5.1 can be met, hence we
have the following:
Corollary 5.6. Let P be either pre-caliber ω1 or Kn for some n and ΓP the class of all
P-forcing notions of some bounded size. Then MLF (ΓP) = S4.2 .
However, to deal with allP-forcings at the same time would require a different method,
so the following is open:
Question 5.7. Let P be either pre-caliber ω1 or Kn for some n . What is the modal logic of
all P-forcing notions?
To conclude, the only property in the above diagram we did not discuss yet is c.c.c.
Question 5.8. What is the modal logic of all c.c.c forcing notions?
This natural question was already raised in [6]. The difficulty in answering it is that
the class of all c.c.c forcing notions is not directed, so it does not contain S4.2. It is
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reflexive and transitive, so Hamkins and Löwe conjectured that the answer is S4. To
prove this, one would probably need to find a labeling for models based on trees, as the
class of all trees is a class of simple frames characterizing S4. It should be mentioned that
in [7], a labeling of models based frames which are “spiked pre-Boolean algebras” (cf.
[7] for exact definition) was provided, thus establishing an upper bound which is strictly
between S4 and S4.2. However it is not known whether this modal theory is finitely
axiomatizable, so it is not yet clear whether this can be shown to be a lower bound as
well by the current methods. So, this question remains open.
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